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Executive summary
To be fully prepared for Lebanon’s possible transformation into a
major oil and gas producer, the risks of corruption in connection to its
nascent petroleum sector need to be better understood and addressed.
Given Lebanon’s dismal track record in countering corruption and its
chronically gridlocked political process, the risks of corruption in the
country’s nascent petroleum sector are significant. 
This paper tracks such risks along the value chain of the country’s
expected petroleum production and in the context of revenue
management and expenditure. It argues that the first steps in petroleum
governance have been encouraging but are far from optimal. Sources of
concern pertain to the Lebanese Petroleum Administration’s mandate
and relative insulation from political interference, sub-optimal trans-
parency in the pre-qualification process, the envisaged non-disclosure
of exploration and production agreements, and the questionable
assumption that sub-contracting for offshore petroleum activities will
be largely self-regulating. In addition, a range of state institutions
and agencies that will be crucial to daily petroleum governance are
unlikely to cope if not drastically reformed. Looking further ahead,
this paper touches on a number of policy choices that will have to be
made if or when Lebanon’s petroleum reserves are confirmed, including
the establishment of a national oil company, determining the role and
management of a ‘sovereign fund’, and considering more radical
proposals for petroleum revenue expenditure and sharing. It concludes
by arguing that a lively and informed national debate on the
specificities and technicalities of Lebanon’s petroleum sector may
help to create the very prerequisites of political change and create
more favorable conditions to counter the risks of corruption.
2
Introduction
The discovery of gas and oil deposits off the coast of Lebanon has yet
to be confirmed but it has already inspired hope and optimism for the
country’s future economic viability and development. Significant
revenues extracted from producing oil and gas, or ‘petroleum’ to
denote both, indeed can become a source of wealth and sustained
economic growth if managed properly and in accordance with
internationally tested good practices adjusted to Lebanon’s political
and institutional conditions. However, a large body of literature and
international experience shows that the extraction and marketing of
oil and gas resources, in addition to associated revenue management
and expenditure policies, are exposed to high risks of lacking
transparency, discretionary decision-making, unaccountability,
favoritism, rampant corruption, and/or waste. Furthermore, a windfall
of natural resource rents, or the expectation thereof, also tends to
encourage a scramble for and brings about high competition over
resources, while (perceptions of) entrenched corruption and unjust
distribution of economic opportunities and revenues may set the
stage for new and/or reinvigorated (violent) conflicts. Given its own
troublesome past and experience of rampant corruption and civil
conflict, these general risks are especially pertinent in the Lebanese
context. For now, and despite clear efforts to counter corruption and
increase transparency and accountability, the country’s institutional
capacities appear too weak to meet the heightened need for a solid
framework that regulating the petroleum sector and expected windfall
of revenues typically calls for. At the same time, Lebanon cannot
afford oil and gas discoveries that magnify or add to its already high
levels of corruption, worsen real and perceived injustice in governance,
and fuel conflict. 
This paper presents an analytical framework for assessing and
mitigating the risks of corruption in Lebanon’s nascent petroleum
sector. It draws on many discussions with Lebanese officials in relevant
government institutions, stakeholders in the private oil and gas sector,
Lebanon’s business community more generally, its civil society, and
some foreign diplomats closely following Lebanon’s petroleum
developments. It was agreed with interviewees, unless stated other-
wise, to only cite them without attribution in order to encourage a
frank discussion about what are often considered highly contentious
issues. It should be emphasized that the more critical observations in
this paper do not suggest that corruption or cronyism has occurred or
will take place; the paper merely flags the risks or probabilities of
such practices if not addressed properly. 
The key aims of this paper are to assess the general risks of
corruption in connection to Lebanon’s emerging gas and oil sector,
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identify what institutional and regulatory measures and policy tools
have thus far been put into place and assess whether these are 
sufficiently robust to counter or reduce corruption risks, and formulate
proposals to help inform a growing debate on how the risks of
corruption and malpractice associated with Lebanon’s emerging oil and
gas sector—all along its value chain—can and should be reduced.1
The Petroleum-Corruption Nexus
Numerous studies have demonstrated that the extraction of natural
resources generally, and oil and gas more specifically, often comes
with heightened levels of corruption and malpractice in governance
(Ross 2003, 24-26; Marshall 2001; Sachs and Warner 1999, 13-38).
This literature, mostly drawing on large-N quantitative methodologies,
was developed in an attempt to understand the exact causal 
mechanisms at work in purported correlations between natural 
resource abundance, variously defined, and inferior or disappointing
levels of sustained economic growth and development. From this 
perspective, institutions matter in that they are tasked with 
formulating and carrying out vital policies to counter or prevent a
host of harmful economic and financial effects of revenue windfalls
from the extraction of natural resources, including ‘Dutch disease’, the
volatility of oil and gas prices, and, hence, revenue and environmental
challenges. While from this perspective the need for solid and sound
institutions and policies is particularly underscored and even becomes
acute as soon as natural resource rents arrive, many have argued that
the relative financial and technical complexity of the oil and gas 
industry, their state ownership, in combination with large rents con-
trolled by state agencies and a host of political effects ascribed to
them often tend to undermine states’ capacity to build and sustain
such necessary institutional qualities (Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004,
181-193; McPherson and MacSearraigh 2007, 201-202). A lack of
transparency, reduced levels of accountability, patronage substituting
for political representation, and the temptation to waste rent windfalls
on white elephant projects are in this context variously argued to
cause systemic malpractices in governance as failing institutions cause
‘mother nature to corrupt’ (Leite and Weidmann 1999).
The suggested correlations and causal mechanisms involving the
oil-corruption nexus continue to be fiercely disputed in academic 
debates, as are most other dimensions of the alleged ‘natural 
resource curse’ (Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008, 248-264; Di John
2007, 970-974; Ledermann and Maloney 2007). Without intending to
comprehensively review this literature, for the purposes of the current
paper three observations in this context will have to suffice, as they
will steer my own assessment of the risks of corruption in Lebanon’s
4
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The paper will not cover or speculate on
current or future developments in
Lebanon’s expected onshore potential
for oil and gas, which—if confirmed—
would considerably complicate the
analysis and very likely further under-
score the risks of both corruption and
conflict.  
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emerging oil and gas industry and related issues of governance. 
First, not all oil and gas-producing countries suffer from heightened
or extraordinary levels of corruption. In this context it has been 
commonly observed that it matters a great deal whether the country
already has solid institutions in place at the time that petroleum is
discovered, in which case it is more likely that appropriate institutional
adjustments are made to counter or cushion the perilous effects of the
‘natural resource curse’ (Frankel 2012, 34; Smith, Engen et al. 2012, 262).
Conversely, ‘green field’ countries with weak pre-existing institutional
capacities and already alarming levels of pre-discovery corruption are
especially at risk of falling into the oil-corruption trap. Even so, not
all countries with modest or even weak institutional capacities entered
a spiral of corruption when they found themselves endowed with
ample natural resources. Indeed, oil and gas producing countries, even
when relatively new to the sector, show varying levels of institutional
development and associated corruption. Indeed, among these countries
one can find an array of institutions and regulatory measures that had
variable effects on petroleum-related corruption levels. 
Historical institutional antecedents may partly explain such variation,
but these and post-discovery institution building relevant to the oil
and gas sector do not come about in a vacuum. Just as institutions
more generally, they are generated, shaped, and underpinned by public
decision-making processes and political struggles. This leads to a second
observation that, although perhaps sounding self-evident to some, is
often neglected in the predominantly economistic literature on the
‘natural resource curse’. To understand and predict whether, why, and
how institutions governing the oil and gas sector will be solid enough
to withstand corruption, or not, attention should be paid to the 
‘political settlement’, or the power constellations and the rules (both
written and unwritten) affecting and governing public decision-making
on creating, sustaining, and reforming relevant institutions. Given
countries’ specific features in this context, their political settlements
should be taken into account in order to both explain their respective
existing institutions and to prescribe ways in which ensuing levels or
risks of corruption can be feasibly mitigated. 
Third, economists using large-N studies and operating on highly
aggregated levels of analysis involving, inter alia, ‘natural resource
dependency’ and ‘corruption’ may have developed a strong nose for
‘smelling a rat’ but they do not tell us much about where, exactly, it is
hiding. This has repercussions for understanding where, how, and why
the risks of corruption manifest themselves just as it reduces the 
utility of such studies for proposals to effectively counter more specific
risks (Kolstad et al. 2008, 23). By contrast, investigative research into
corruption in some countries’ oil and gas sector that are most notorious
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for corruption and malpractices were conducted by such organizations
as Global Witness and Human Rights Watch (2004, 2010). Such studies
have the advantage of identifying relevant bottlenecks in specific 
contexts, yet they are often highly descriptive in nature to the extent
of failing to offer much transferable knowledge and insights. Others
have taken an approach that is perhaps more useful in this context as
they proposed an assessment of corruption risks along the industry’s
‘value chain’, which involves an exploration process, a production
process, and a post-production or decommissioning phase (Al-Kasim
et al. 2008, 203-209, 214). Depending on the robustness of regulatory
frameworks and institutions tasked with upholding them, opportunities
and risks of corruption may flourish variously at all stages in the
value chain. Along these lines, Farouk Al-Kasim (et.al) focused 
exclusively on the regulation of the oil industry in its pre-operational
and (post-) operational phases (their results are presented in 
appendix 1). Building on this approach, one may add the dimension
of revenue management and expenditure. As Michael Ross put it suc-
cinctly, ‘[t]he most important political fact about oil—and the reason
it leads to so much trouble in so many developing countries—is that
the revenues it bestows on governments are unusually large, do not
come from taxes, fluctuate unpredictably, and can be easily hidden’
(Ross 2012, 6). Depending on what policy choices are made in this
context and given the robustness of relevant institutions implement-
ing them, ample opportunities and risks of corruption may arise on
the revenue and expenditure side of oil and gas extraction as well. 
Using an inverse logic, organizations campaigning for good 
governance in natural resource sectors worldwide have pursued a 
similarly comprehensive yet disaggregated approach. For example,
Publish What You Pay (PWYP) produced a ‘chain for change’ tracking the
need for robust and transparent institutions and policies from the 
moment of exploration up to dismantling extractive projects (Alba
2009). Together with other organizations, including the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and Revenue Watch Institute
(now the Natural Resource Governance Institute), it designed elaborate
recommendations to ensure transparency, accountability, and solid 
institutional arrangements to govern the natural resource industry in
most of its aspects (Ross 2012, 249).2 However, even when some of
these generic recommendations may prove to be highly relevant for
Lebanon, they need to be assessed for their appropriateness and 
feasibility, and tailored to local circumstances. Most importantly from
the perspective of the current paper, such recommendations also need
to address relevant opportunities and risks of corruption arising from
the institutional capacities and underlying political settlement in
Lebanon. It is to these conditions that we turn first.
6
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A common criticism in this context is
that these and other initiatives focus
primarily on how revenues accrued from
natural resources are collected, not how
they are spent. 
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Lebanon: Public Institutions, Corruption and
Political Settlement 
Upon hearing news of a significant petroleum endowment likely hidden
off the country’s coast, many Lebanese intuitively sensed the mixed
blessing that this may bring. Few do not have some proposal on how
to spend the expected revenues in a country that is burdened with
public debt, inadequate basic infrastructure and welfare services, and
is suffering from sharp inequalities in terms of income and wealth
(Fadlallah 2012). Yet, many commentators, Lebanese and foreign
alike, already warned particularly against the risk, and for some even
the inevitability, of widespread corruption in Lebanon’s emerging 
petroleum sector. They variously suspect that high levels of corruption
will follow from an unhappy mix involving international oil companies
not especially reputed for fair and transparent practices; Lebanon’s
political class that is widely viewed as corrupt, greedy, and looked at
with distrust; and a dysfunctional, divided, and gridlocked political
process at best geared toward deals ‘dividing up the cake’3 (Abu Muslih
2013, An-Nahar 2011 and 2013). In short, a windfall of business
opportunities and revenues generated by petroleum extraction is
widely sensed as carrying serious risks of magnifying these various
failings and lifting them to unprecedented levels. In response, Lebanese
politicians and officials have emphasized that corruption in the
emerging governance of the petroleum sector will not be tolerated.
Implicitly, legal measures contain a similar pledge. Most importantly,
the country’s Petroleum Activities Regulations decree (Decree 10289,
article 162) explicitly bans any form of corruption or bribery in the
sector, as defined by Lebanese law and international conventions. 
Furthermore, former Minister of Energy and Water Jibran Bassil 
indicated that Lebanon intends to join EITI, which would compel the
government to fully disclose its revenues from petroleum activities
and establish a multi-stakeholder group to oversee its commitments
arising from membership (Executive Magazine 2013).4
Some may dismiss popularly held views on the risks of corruption
in Lebanon’s emerging petroleum sector as ill informed (especially on
account of the technicalities of the petroleum industry), excessively
pessimistic, or suffering from unrealistically high expectations, or all
of the above. To the extent that a track record of public institution
building and corruption provides a guide to a country’s future ability
to establish sound and corruption-free institutions governing an
emerging petroleum sector—as many researchers on the topic claim—
then Lebanon’s past achievements in this regard indeed constitute a
serious source of concern. Internationally recognized indices covering
(perceptions of) corruption and bribery levels in addition to numerous
opinion surveys held among the Lebanese population at large and
7
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‘In the end everything will be divided
up among the main politicians. The
people won’t get to see anything of it.
That’s trivial to anyone.’ From author’s
interview with Lebanese academic. 
4
A team within the International 
Monetary Fund is assisting the
Lebanese authorities to prepare itself
for EITI candidacy. Author’s interview
with international diplomat specialized
in petroleum finance, 9 June 2014. 
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among Lebanese and foreign entrepreneurs consistently suggest that
extremely high corruption levels pervade Lebanon’s political system,
its public sector, its private sector, and society at large (appendix 2).
Those indices that have included Lebanon over a longer time also 
suggest alarmingly rising levels of corruption in Lebanon, especially
in recent years. In comparative terms, they rank Lebanon among the
worst affected countries by corruption, both within the Middle East
and North Africa (MENA) and worldwide. Lebanon’s scores on 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) also
suggest deteriorating corruption levels in 2013 compared to the years
before; most likely as a result of the general erosion and paralysis of
government in the context of the worsening Syrian crisis and its
destabilizing effects on Lebanon (Daily Star 2013).5
Academic research carried out by social scientists and economists,
both by international and Lebanese scholars, unanimously confirms
assessments of Lebanon’s corruption problem and generally found the
latter to be so engrained as to have become institutionalized in all
matters of public life. In my own book I conducted a qualitative
analysis of numerous corruption allegations in the context of a range
of public institutions following the signing of the Taef Accord in 1989
up until 2012 (Leenders 2012). It detailed how senior policymakers
and high-ranking public servants in key sectors of the Lebanese 
economy and governance, including transportation, health care, natural
resources and energy, construction, and social assistance programs
were implicated of corruption. The study is congruent with the 
assessments of numerous other scholars that corruption and associated
practices of clientelism have permeated Lebanon’s state institutions
and politicians’ relations with the private sector and civil society alike
throughout the post-Taef period (Cammet and Issar 2010, 381-421;
Cammet 2011, 70-97; Chen and Cammet 2012, 1-8; Stel and Naudé
2013; Baumann 2012; Leenders 2004; Balanche 2012, 145-8, 163; 
Gaspard 2004, 213, 219; Kingston 2013, 57-60, 164; Picard 2000).  
None of these dire assessments should be uncritically or automatically
applied to forecast what awaits Lebanon in terms of governing the 
petroleum sector and the management of its revenues. Indeed, key
policymakers, highly capable regulators, and civil society activists
alike are adamant that with the expected start of petroleum activities
and the arrival of their revenues Lebanon will finally turn its back on
inadequate institution building and rampant corruption. As one official
at the MEW stated:
The governance of the oil sector inevitably will be within the system,
whether you like it or not. This leaves two options, forget about it, or
create a nucleus that is relatively insulated and does something different.
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As claimed by former Justice Minister
Jihad Azur in reference to allegedly 
rising corruption levels at the end of
2013, ‘The situation deteriorated last
year. The state is getting weaker and is
unable to enforce any decision. As a 
result of this laxity, some of the 
employees continue this practice with 
complete impunity.’  
The international oil companies demand quality. In this sense the 
petroleum sector provides an opportunity to establish units of new and
well-qualified people in several ministries. As there is a revenue-making
potential, there will be an effort to build sound institutions. Petroleum
this way presents an incentive for reform.6
Furthermore, the technicalities of the petroleum sector and the 
institutions created to govern the sector are entirely new, as Lebanon
has never embarked on significant petroleum production before. This,
one could reason, provides Lebanon with an opportunity to this time
create more efficient and less corrupt institutions. Yet, such individual
qualities, good intentions, and relatively anomalous features of the
petroleum sector should be understood against the systemic causes of
widespread institutional failure and corruption in Lebanon generally,
which are still far from being addressed. In this context, many rivaling
explanations have been suggested (Leenders 2004, 232-235). Indeed, it
may be persuasively argued that an analysis of a complex phenomenon
like corruption cannot be mono-causal and, by contrast, will need to
be tailored to the specific sector and operations in which it occurs. This
offers an additional reason to be cautious about unreservedly juxtaposing
Lebanon’s overall corruption record to its emerging petroleum sector. 
By comparing the trajectories of various Lebanese sectors and state
institutions in which corruption thrived, one can find clear trends in
that they persistently lacked a clear mandate governed by procedures
and regulations with robust external checks and controls to ensure 
accountability, in addition to a separation of public office from private
interests (Leenders 2004, 72-121). Such failings have given way to and
became associated with Lebanon’s ‘allotment state’ (dawlat al-muhasasa)
in which fierce struggles over the building of state institutions coexist
with an utter disregard for the universal application of institutional
rules (Leenders 2004, 231-232). In this context, the country’s political
class divides highly prized resources, opportunities, and privileges 
accrued from the state and its prerogatives among themselves and
their allies and, to some extent, they pass it on to their (sectarian)
constituencies to ensure their continued political support.
Arguably, Lebanon’s political settlement, or its post-Taef arrangement
to manage multiple conflicts and generate decisions on institutions
and policies, is at the root of the country’s endemic failure to produce
robust institutions able to withstand high levels of corruption. One of
the major characteristics and indeed flaws of the political settlement
was that it converted the political and military stalemate of the late
1980s into a new arrangement for public decision-making that was
similarly characterized by gridlock and fragmentation of power. In
brief, Lebanon’s political settlement significantly shaped the process of
9Spoils of oil? Assessing and mitigating the risks of corruption in Lebanon’s emerging offshore petroleum sector
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decision-making and institution building in Lebanon’s Second Republic
(Leenders 2004, 122-163).7 Even when the exact manifestations and
relative weight of each of its main features have somewhat changed and
are likely to change in the future, they by and large have remained
the same and jointly constitute the context in which Lebanon’s 
regulatory and institutional framework for its petroleum sector has
been designed, will be further developed, and will be enforced.
Assessing Lebanon’s First Steps in Petroleum
Governance and the Risks of Corruption
Over the last four years Lebanon achieved a number of milestones in
its preparations for petroleum sector governance. Overall, stakeholders
and observers consider the process to be reasonably transparent and
promising, even when frustration is rife about the necessary steps and
policies being significantly delayed because of the country’s political
gridlock, change of cabinets and ministers, and more recently the 
crisis concerning the election of a new president and when and how to
hold parliamentary elections. Within these political constraints, the
parliament approved the Offshore Petroleum Resources Law in August
2010 (Law 132, 24 August 2010), which presents a general framework
on how the sector should be organized, regulated, and governed.8 It
was followed in April 2012 by Decree 7968 (7 April 2012) establishing
the Lebanese Petroleum Administration (LPA), whose members were
appointed on 4 December 2012. In February 2013 the Council of 
Ministers approved the Petroleum Activities Regulations for Lebanon
(Decree 10289, 30 April 2013), which provides general guidelines for
commercial involvement in the sector and their regulation. In 
accordance with this emerging legal framework, companies were invited
in March 2013 to submit their credentials for the purpose of pre-
qualification, which, in turn, will allow such companies to submit their
bids for the envisaged licensing round. Decree 9882 (13 February 2013)
was issued calling on interested companies to apply for pre-qualification
by detailing further conditions and required documents. Out of 
fifty-two applying companies from twenty-five countries, twelve 
applicants prequalified as ‘operators’ and thirty-four companies as
‘non-operators’.9 Yet, subsequently two decrees (one on delineating
the ten offshore production ‘blocks’, the other on the model contract,
or model Exploration and Production Agreement, EPA) have been held
up in the Council of Ministers for approval. After a new cabinet was
formed—led by Prime Minister Tamam Salam—in March 2014, an
inter-ministerial committee was set up to study the two draft decrees
but, to date, no agreement has been reached on their exact contents
for them to be passed. As a result, the actual invitation for the tender
for the EPAs has been delayed, most recently until 14 August 2014. 
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It did so by way of an extreme dispersal
of power and associated quasi-permanent
gridlock in decision-making, the 
predominance of the troika and the
politics of muhasasa, continuous
attempts to circumvent the built-in
stalemates of the political arrangement
laid out in the Taef Accord and the 
constitution, extremely weak popular
support for political elites exposing
them to confessionalist strategies and
narrow, local agendas, and the overriding
role of the interests of external powers
in Lebanon, as well as their manipulation
of the country’s differences.  
8
All laws and decrees are available at the
LPA website. http://www.lpa.gov.lb 
9
Lebanese Republic, Ministry of Energy
and Water Resources, Petroleum 
Administration Lebanon, Lebanon’s
First Offshore Licensing Round–The 
Prequalified Companies.  
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The Lebanese Petroleum Administration
The Lebanese media have generally welcomed the establishment of the
LPA as a positive step toward competent and responsible institution
building in a country that has lacked such qualities for a long time.
One MP, a member of the political bloc (the Free Patriotic Movement)
to which former Minister of Energy and Water Jibran Bassil belongs,
went as far as to claim that ‘the new petroleum administration is the
first proper public institution created since the times of [former 
President] Fu’ad Chehab.’10
Law 132 and Decree 7968 essentially mandate the LPA with an
overall advisory and supportive role in preparing and applying the
technical and financial framework for the country’s emerging petroleum
sector. Although separate from the MEW, the LPA falls under the 
ministry’s tutelage and, indirectly, is heavily reliant on the Council of
Ministers in making key decisions. As such, the LPA has some of the
features of a regulatory body but, arguably, it lacks sufficient 
institutional independence that is required to perform its hefty tasks
without political interference. 
In this the LPA differs from what was initially envisaged. From the
mid-2000s onward draft laws were drawn up, foremost involving 
advisors at the MEW assisted by experts sent by the Norwegian Oil for
Development Program from 2007 onward, that called for a relatively
independent regulator for the petroleum sector by insulating it from
political interference, whether by the MEW or the Council of
Ministers.11 Some of those involved in these early efforts stressed that
a fully independent regulator was not considered feasible, and perhaps
would even be undesirable, as it would run the risk of simply being
sidelined or marginalized by political authorities.12 However, before
adopting Petroleum Law 132 in August 2010 objections raised within
the Council of Ministers caused this envisaged independence, even if
relative in nature, to be watered down further. Perhaps most 
importantly, the LPA lacks financial independence as it is stipulated
that its budget is to be part of the overall budget of the Ministry of
Energy and Water (MEW). 
The LPA board consists of six members. On the positive side, they
are barred from having any personal interests, directly or indirectly, in
the contracts concluded by the LPA or with any company working in
the field by being related through any of their relatives (up to the
fourth degree). After leaving office former LPA staff are not to engage
in any private sector activity pertaining to petroleum in Lebanon for
at least two years. Furthermore, the presidency of the board is to rotate
among the six members, which can be read as a measure working
against potential abuse of power. Their high salaries, at least by
Lebanese public sector standards, also can be viewed as mitigating the
11Spoils of oil? Assessing and mitigating the risks of corruption in Lebanon’s emerging offshore petroleum sector
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Author’s interview, 3 June 2014.
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Author’s interview with Ali Berro, former
advisor at the MEW, 6 June 2014 and
with foreign oil expert, 20 June 2014.
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Ibid.
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risk of bribery, provided that one subscribes to the disputed claim
that susceptibility to bribery correlates with low or more modest
salaries, and vice versa (Abbink 2000).13
All LPA board members were appointed by the Council of Ministers
upon the recommendation of the minister of energy and water. In
practice, this legally prescribed formula necessitated a grand political
bargain involving key sectarian and political leaders backing their 
preferred candidates from a shortlist based on individual merit and
experience. This pre-selection was done by a committee comprising a
representative of the Civil Service Board (the state’s human resources
agency), the minister of state for administrative reform, the deputy-
governor of the central bank (acting for the office for the minister of
state for administrative reform), and the minister of energy and water.
The committee received more than 600 applications, 18 of which were
shortlisted and presented to the Council of Ministers.14 Most agree
that the selection process was unusually rigorous and transparent, and
that the six selected candidates are highly capable and experienced,
as some have been drawn from renowned international petroleum
companies. Concerns remain, however, that regardless of their 
qualifications the board members will be beholden to their political
backers, thus making them indirectly vulnerable to such politicians’
possible conflicts of interest. Should these fears prove to be founded,
the LPA board members risk sharing the fate of many other first grade
public servants throughout Lebanon’s public administration (Leenders
2004, 224). In addition, there may be a risk that a lack of political
agreement on future replacements (following expiration of the LPA
board’s six year mandate or after individual dismissals or resignations)
may cause the LPA board to sustain vacancies crippling the agency, as
happened frequently since the early 1990s in numerous key state
agencies and ministries more generally.15
Finally, and despite the potential avenues that all these features 
already hypothetically offer in terms of political interference and 
influence, the LPA’s role is of a mainly advisory nature in relation to
the overriding role of the minister of energy and water who, in turn,
is to obtain the endorsement of the Council of Ministers for his/her
policies and decisions. In short, within this institutional setup, and
despite the rigorous process that resulted in the appointment of 
individuals with the highest qualifications and right intentions, the
LPA runs a significant risk of becoming subjected to political pressures
and influence. This vulnerability is underscored by the power of the
minister of energy and water to present LPA staff to the state’s 
disciplinary board for alleged violations of the law and neglect of
duty, thereby giving the minister, at least hypothetically, a powerful
tool to press dissenting staff into compliance.
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Officials at the MEW counter that, even when the LPA is not fully
independent, it still has important leverage in the power structure 
involving the MEW and the Council of Ministers.16 They point out that
the minister of energy and water cannot diverge from the LPA’s 
recommendations when it comes to key policies or measures in the 
petroleum sector, just as the minister will have to explain his/her 
position to the Council of Ministers if he/she does. Yet, it is doubtful
that this will be sufficient, as it does not shield the LPA from possible
pressures from or overriding powers of the Council of Ministers, with
or without collusion with the minister of energy and water.  
In the hypothetical event that the LPA would succumb to political
pressure and associated malpractices in regulating and governing the
petroleum sector, chances are that with current auditing mechanisms
and their administrative capacities this may not be properly detected.
External auditing of the LPA’s activities is to be carried out a posteriori
by the Court of Accounts (CA, Diwan al-Muhasaba), the state’s financial
watchdog (Law 132, Article 10). Unless this agency is dramatically
revamped and significantly strengthened—a necessity underscored 
repeatedly since the early 1990s but never seriously followed up—it will
not be able to carry out this task adequately. The CA currently has no
expertise on matters related to the oil and gas sector and, throughout
the 1990s to date it failed to meaningfully monitor the MEW’s operations
in Lebanon’s unruly petroleum imports sector. Its senior staff and 
auditors lost immunity since the 1970s from dismissal by the president
and, under the stipulations agreed to in Taef, the Council of Ministers.
The CA has consistently suffered from personnel shortages, political
bickering over key staff appointments, political interference, and from
blatant political maneuvers to suppress the few incriminating reports
that under these conditions it was still able to produce (Leenders
2004, 164-167; As-Safir 2012). These obstacles undermined the CA’s
operations dramatically, thereby earning it a reputation of being
overly legalistic and out of touch with the state’s responsibilities.
The Prequalification Round
It is of course too early to say whether or how the LPA’s institutional
framework will affect its staff’s professionalism or integrity in practice.
For now, stakeholders including the concerned international oil 
companies (IOCs) say they are impressed with the efficient and 
transparent way in which the LPA has approached the pre-qualification
round, the LPA’s first major accomplishment.17 Others, including
Lebanese journalists working on petroleum issues, expressed satisfaction
with the LPA’s efforts to explain its policies and operations, and answer
their questions, at first without attribution and, more recently, by
giving high-profile media interviews (Hoteit 2014).18 Based on this it
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seems that the regulation compelling the LPA to first obtain the prior
consent of the minister of energy and water before making public
statements (Decree 7968, article 5) is liberally applied in favor of
transparency and outreach to the public, although the latter would be
fully realized if this stipulation was removed.
In terms of transparency and accountability, there remain a number
of concerns about the pre-qualification round. According to Decree
9882, successful companies need to comply with a strict set of legal,
financial, technical, and environmental criteria designed to enable the
LPA to identify serious contenders who possess relevant experience in
the technically demanding business of deep-water offshore petroleum
extraction and who have sufficient financial clout to carry out and
sustain their tasks.19 In this context a distinction is made between 
‘operating companies’ and ‘non-operating companies’, which need to
meet different criteria, and which, after being pre-qualified, will be
invited to present their joint bids for an EPA as a consortium 
comprising at least one operator and two non-operating companies.
Accordingly, companies submitted their pre-qualification applications
between February and March 2013. After assessing the applications, the
MEW and the LPA announced on 18 April 2013 that twelve companies
had pre-qualified as operators and thirty-four as non-operators. The
large number of contenders promises to encourage a highly competitive
bidding process, which from an anti-corruption perspective could be
viewed as placing some checks on unfair practices such as granting
contracts against suboptimal terms. Crucially, however, no sufficient
documentation or explanation was provided about why and how the
companies had been found to meet the criteria of pre-qualification.20
Sources at the MEW told the author that it refrained from publishing
such information after receiving strong requests from the companies
to maintain confidentiality, especially when it was suggested to re-
lease data on their total capital.21
Importantly, for the main prequalified operators such sub-optimal
disclosure in this respect raises no immediate questions. After all, the
twelve large companies that prequalified are all internationally and
publicly renowned for having many years of relevant experience in
offshore petroleum extraction. Also, as all these companies are listed
on US and/or European stock exchanges, since the US Congress passed
the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 and the EU adopted similar legislation
they are obliged to disclose their capital and assets just as they are
normally keen to inform their shareholders about their activities. Such
is far less evident for the pre-qualified non-operating companies. 
As one observer put it, ‘so, ok, the LPA says it found that these 
companies have met the criteria and they listed their names, but give
me one reason to trust them.’22 This is not to imply that unfair or
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shady practices did in fact occur. Indeed, MEW officials stress that the
prequalified companies all met the legal, financial, and technical 
criteria.23 Yet, a key concern in this context remains the extent to
which Lebanese businessmen, in possible or perhaps even likely 
partnerships with political leaders, may gain access to the large rents
associated with upstream activities by the winning consortiums. From
this perspective, the failure to release full ownership data on the 
prequalified (non-operating) companies reduced the value of what
otherwise seems to have been intended as a fully transparent pre-
qualification process. Sources at the MEW objected in this context that
such a degree of confidentiality is not uncommon in prequalification
processes worldwide.24 Perhaps so, but Lebanon’s dismal record of 
corruption and its endemic blurring of public and private interests 
arguably calls for extra caution and full transparency. 
In terms of transparency, the above can be viewed as an unused 
opportunity even if or when such can be largely explained by companies’
insistence on confidentiality. Arguably, the incomplete transparency
caused by not disclosing how and why prequalified companies met the
criteria, and by not identifying their owners, was compounded by a
stipulation in Decree 9882 (article 3). The latter allows non-operators to
partner with other companies in their applications for prequalification
as long as at least the main applicant (and not necessarily its partners)
can prove that it meets the prequalification criteria, including having
relevant experience in the sector and possessing at least $500 million
in total assets. One Lebanese lawyer specializing in the petroleum 
sector argued in this context that this stipulation may be viewed as
sitting uneasily with the general principle set out in Law 132, and 
explicitly mentioned in Decree 9882,25 that only capable and experienced
companies may take part in oil extraction.26 After all, now companies
with no relevant experience whatsoever may hypothetically join the
consortiums by partnering with an established company in the sector
and jointly prequalify.27 Sources within the MEW explained that the
Council of Ministers had added this option to an earlier draft of the
pre-qualification decree, prepared by the LPA, in order to allow for
Lebanese participation in the consortiums and promote the country’s
private sector.28 In addition, they stressed that the main company
which decides to partner with other companies retains full legal 
responsibility and liability in any joint application for prequalification,
and that as such the provision contains no risks.29
Yet, if (Lebanese) companies lacking relevant experience in petroleum
may still be viewed as desirable partners to other (foreign) companies
that do meet these criteria, why would fully skilled and solvent foreign
petroleum companies want to associate themselves with (Lebanese)
companies that cannot or do not necessarily demonstrate a relevant
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track record? Again, there is no suggestion made here that dishonest
practices in this context did occur. Indeed, it is quite conceivable that
foreign companies wish to partner with Lebanese partners in order to
be better placed, for example, to meet the legally prescribed criterion
to employ at least 80 percent Lebanese citizens among its workforce or
to better navigate the country’s institutional and economic landscape
generally by virtue of incorporating local knowledge and expertise.
Another conjectural suggestion, and therefore risk, may be that 
companies this way prepare the ground for gaining wasta, or influence
peddling judged beneficial or necessary in future dealings with the
Lebanese authorities.
Of course, there are ample alternatives for foreign non-operating
companies to allow for or encourage direct or indirect Lebanese 
participation, for example by selling stock or by establishing credit 
relationships with Lebanese banks.30 None of this is necessarily illegal
or even circumspect. On the contrary, there are some good economic
and practical reasons to encourage Lebanese participation as much as
possible. However, in Lebanon’s climate of fundamental distrust 
involving the relationship between business and politics, the above
also points to the imperative that any future access by (Lebanese)
businessmen to the consortiums’ sizeable royalties and shares of oil
revenues should at least be made fully transparent and known to the
public. Despite efforts to make the pre-qualification process as 
transparent as possible, this requirement has yet to be fully met. 
Toward Tendering for Exploration and Production Agreements
Evidently, concerns about the transparency of the prequalification
process may become critical in the process of bidding for and signing
contracts, or EPAs. In addition, there are a few concerns regarding the
envisaged confidentiality of these EPAs. Sources within the MEW say
that the ‘model contract’ will be disclosed as it will be subject to a 
decree that is currently under examination by a ministerial committee.31
In their view, this will make it unnecessary to disclose the actual EPAs
concluded with the bidding consortium(s) as the final contracts will
not significantly differ from the model EPA.32 Yet, in this context, the
difference between production-sharing contracts and the alternative,
that of licensing, is of importance. While in the latter case all financial
stipulations—such as royalties, taxes, and ‘profit oil’ and ‘cost oil’—
are set by law, production-sharing contracts contain certain ‘biddable
items’, i.e. agreements on ways to share petroleum proceeds. For
reasons of transparency, the licensing system is generally preferred (if
certainly not always practiced, not even in countries subscribing to
‘best practices’) primarily because all financial or fiscal agreements
will this way be made public and be more difficult to change by way
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of negotiation.33 If kept undisclosed, production-sharing contracts will
cause agreements on such crucial issues to remain unknown to the
public. Lebanon has opted for a hybrid system whereby some fiscal
items are set by law (taxes and royalties to the state) but others 
(including ‘costs oil’ to reimburse the right holders, and a percentage
of the remaining oil split between the state and the producer) are left
to be determined in the final EPAs; the so-called ‘biddable items’.34 For
now there are no legal obligations for the EPA contracts to be made
public, although former Minister of Energy and Water Jibran Bassil
publicly made a promise to this effect (Executive 2013). Sources
within the MEW argue that it is the companies who are insisting on
confidentiality, as the contracts will contain sensitive geological and
production data that will be of great interest to their competitors.35
This, however, is no good reason for Lebanese authorities to not at
least release the fiscal details in the EPAs or to redact the latter to the
same effect (Publish What You Pay 2012). If this does not happen, 
financial disclosure requirements of international oil companies falling
under US and European jurisdictions will only be partially helpful in
extrapolating what the fiscal agreements within the EPAs may have
been.36 For now, international oil companies are not obliged to 
disclose the contracts they sign, neither would the Lebanese government
be under current legislation, not even if it were to join the EITI.
The need for disclosure of Lebanon’s EPA contracts and its fiscal 
details, in addition to full transparency on the ownership of all right
holders in the extraction of petroleum has only become more pertinent
in the Lebanese context of continuous political bickering over the 
two ‘missing decrees’ that still need to be adopted before tendering
can start. In Lebanese media and in conversations with the author,
disagreements in this respect have been explained in reference to the
preference of former Minister of Energy and Water Jibran Bassil to
auction only a few blocks (blocks 1, 4, 5, 6, and 9) out of ten 
delineated while Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri purportedly prefers
to open all of them at once to receive bids. The pros and cons of both
proposals are beyond the scope of this paper but essentially appear to
come down to different strategies to gain maximum leverage vis-à-vis
oil companies or kick start extraction at maximum levels. However, it
is questionable whether such technical details of substance really 
-constitute the core of the disagreement. Indeed, Berri does not seem
to argue that all blocks opened for bidding will in fact need to be
awarded to companies.37 This has reinforced the impression or
prompted speculation that Lebanon’s political leaders are resorting to
their engrained practice of muhasasa and that their quarrels are, in
fact, about dividing up the revenues and/or business opportunities 
associated with the emerging petroleum sector. Several theories have
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in this context been suggested. They range from politicians placing
sectarian denominations on the blocks and their respective revenues;
them giving priority to blocks that are closest to the territories under
their control in order to benefit from onshore petroleum activities;
them striving for access to the companies that will take part in the
consortiums and/or the upstream operations they will be subcon-
tracting; to geopolitical struggles involving Russia whose companies
are now not among the pre-qualified operating companies.38 None of
these theories can be easily substantiated, others sound unlikely, and
some may be dismissed as rather fanciful. Yet, unfounded speculations
are at least partly a result of the fact that transparency in the process
thus far could, and perhaps should, have been taken to higher levels,
combined with a deeply rooted mistrust of Lebanese politicians. In any
case, the delay caused by continued political bickering over the missing
decrees may in itself have a harmful effect on the competitiveness of
the bidding process if and when it eventually takes place. A number
of prequalified operating companies are rumored to be losing both 
patience and confidence, prompting them to withdraw.39 Sources
within the MEW remain optimistic and argue that in terms of the
number of international oil companies, Lebanon received more interest
than neighboring Israel and Syria.40 They add that prequalified 
companies will not be in a hurry to withdraw given the long-term 
perspectives of petroleum activities and because they spent money on
seismic data and registration. If future withdrawals and reduced 
competition would cause the bids to be unfair to Lebanon, they say that
a decision may be made not to go ahead and wait for better offers.
Upstream Subcontracting
When or if the EPAs will have been signed and the consortiums will
start operating, large scale subcontracting is expected to take place to
service and supply the operators, primarily onshore. Such upstream
activities will range from hiring security companies, supplying 
equipment, and purchasing or leasing land for petroleum installations,
to building and servicing them. Operators are in this context legally
obliged to give ‘preferential treatment to the procurement of Lebanese
originating goods and services when such goods and services are 
internationally competitive with regard to quality, availability, price,
and performance’ (Decree 10289, article 157). Undoubtedly, this 
obligation is aimed at ensuring that Lebanese private sector companies
receive a much-needed boost. Accordingly, scores of Lebanese companies
are already preparing themselves for the petroleum industry.41 At the
same time it has been rightly noted that in the Lebanese context, and
indeed perhaps generally, the risks of corruption and clientelist practices
in subcontracting will be significant.42 Among Lebanese petroleum 
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officials there seems to be an expectation that the operators will be
largely self-regulating in this respect as they are assumed to pursue
efficiency targets that are at odds with favoritism and corruption, and
because as a consortium its members will keep each other in check.43
In congruence with this, sources within Western major oil companies
that prequalified confirm their strong intention to refrain from unfair
practices and bribery, calling them ‘bad business practice’ primarily in
reference to the potentially escalating nature of bribery or sweetheart
deals if given into.44 It is perhaps against this background that the
regulations or mechanisms being put in place or envisaged to mitigate
the risks of corruption in upstream subcontracting do not include 
unusual or overly drastic measures or place stringent disclosure 
obligations on the consortiums. On top of the generally phrased 
legislation banning corruption in all petroleum activities (Decree 10289,
article 162), the operators are expected to subject ‘major procurement
contracts’ to public tendering, to submit a list of prequalified bidders
to the LPA, justify the selection of the supplier, and allow themselves
to be scrutinized by an external auditor (Decree 10289, article 157).
As such, these requirements certainly meet international best practices
and Lebanese authorities should be lauded for adopting them. 
Even when strictly enforced, such legal measures will still not 
necessarily result in reduced levels of corruption or cronyism. Ironically,
one could argue in this context that Lebanon’s general conditions of
heightened corruption risks call for more drastic measures than called
for by best international practices. For one, the Lebanese market is
characterized by strong monopolistic and oligopolistic tendencies,
particularly in the petroleum imports and distribution sector that is
likely to sweep up many subcontracting opportunities (Leenders 2004,
29-37; Traboulsi 2014, 39-41). Sources within the MEW understand-
ably argue that they ‘are not into the business of market regulation.’45
But, for now, neither is any other Lebanese public agency as attempts
to adopt and effectively implement anti-trust legislation have thus far
been unsuccessful. In combination with Lebanon’s blurred boundaries
between business ownership and politics, this forms a source of 
apprehension as far as petroleum subcontracting is concerned. 
Furthermore, it is not fully clear from existing legislation on the
emerging petroleum sector to what extent and how exactly the LPA will
monitor and screen the subcontracting process, and what powers it would
have if any irregularities were to be detected.46 The less than optimal
degree of the LPA’s political insulation generally adds to the risk that
even when it chooses to be pro-active in this field, as the intention
appears to be, it may ultimately not be fully successful in effectively
countering corruption in upstream subcontracting. Under existing 
legislation, public oversight or scrutiny in this respect, by media
19Spoils of oil? Assessing and mitigating the risks of corruption in Lebanon’s emerging offshore petroleum sector
43
Author’s interviews with MEW officials,
6 and 12 June 2014.
44
Author’s interviews, May 2014.
45
Author’s interview, 6 June 2014.
46 
Decree 10289 (article 72) does oblige
operators to disclose their subcontracts
to the LPA, but only upon a decree
drafted by the Minister of Energy and
Water Resources and adopted by the 
Council of Ministers.  Although this can
be positively viewed as acknowledging
the need for disclosure of subcontracts,
it at the same time points up to the
possible pitfalls associated with the
LPA lacking full independence and the
need for public disclosure.    
LCPS Policy Paper
and/or civil society, does not appear to be in the cards as neither op-
erators nor the authorities seem to be under any obligation to publicly
disclose information on tendering, let alone disclose ownership details
of winning companies. Indeed, such details may not be released due
to possible confidentiality clauses in the EPAs covering the formalities
of subcontracting. 
When offshore subcontracting will provide lucrative business 
opportunities, risks are that it may be subjected to pressures of
muhasasa. It is possibly the anticipation thereof that currently 
constitutes one factor in holding back political agreement on the two
missing decrees. Depending on the blocks that will be put up for auction
and will first start production, onshore locations that are closest to the
terminals are likely to witness a boom in construction, services, and
business generally. To the extent that drawing analogies provides any
guidance, wartime control over several clandestine ports by sectarian
militias and illegal seaside properties held by major Lebanese politicians
since, there is a risk that such onshore locations may be viewed as 
political-confessional fiefdoms (Leenders 2004, 188-189; Leenders
1988, 271-287; Al-Akhbar 2012). That, in turn, could place serious
political and confessional constraints on fair and competitive bidding
and fair practices in operators’ upstream subcontracting.     
The consequences of possible corruption, market concentration,
and/or politically induced inefficiencies in subcontracting arrangements
cannot be discounted in the context of the ‘cost oil’ arrangement 
foreseen in the EPAs (Decree 10289, article 72). This allows the 
operators to be reimbursed for their ‘recoverable costs’ in kind. As 
explained above, this constitutes a ‘biddable item’ and, hence, if the
EPAs are not disclosed, it may never become known to the public what
exact arrangements were put in place. Equally, if not strictly moni-
tored, regulated, seriously capped, and publicly disclosed, the ‘cost
oil’ provision may challenge the overall assumption that operators will
be driven by efficiency concerns in their subcontracting. IOCs and
their non-operating partners may ideally seek maximum efficiency
and cost savings, but the need to overcome political constraints and
boost expediency may at times rival such basic incentives. Indeed, 
experiences elsewhere, including in India, suggest that operators may
at times fail to show self-restraint when their subcontracting is not
bound to very strict rules, oversight, and limitations, both by hosting
authorities and the public at large (Achong 2009/2010).47 In short,
market concentration, favoritism, corruption, and measures that fall
short of drastically regulating, policing, and disclosing ‘cost oil’ 
provisions would constitute a risk of Lebanon’s petroleum revenues
being skimmed even before they reach the state’s treasury. 
There are measures that Lebanon could take to mitigate the risks of
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corruption and cronyism in petroleum-related subcontracting. Most
importantly, all tendering and major subcontracting should be made
transparent to both the authorities and the public on a routine basis.
Kazakhstan’s Contract Agency (KCA), established in 2002 to promote
local involvement in petroleum sector activities, could be a source of
emulation in this respect. Among other services, it established an 
automated register that makes procurement processes fully and 
continuously transparent to all parties involved and to the public at
large (Tordo 2013, 126). Accordingly, it tracks information on the 
entire procurement process from the initial tender, through contract
specifications, and up to the award. A similar approach could be
adopted in Lebanon, for example by placing such a publicly accessible
register on upstream subcontracting within the LPA. Companies that
want to place their bids in response to the consortiums’ calls will do
so via the automated register after full disclosure is given on these
companies’ ownership, main shareholders, and their subsidiaries. 
However, reforms should go further, including by adopting a robust
anti-trust law, putting in place a fully competent and independent
regulator, and establishing a unit therein specialized in petroleum-
related activities.
Daily Petroleum Operations and Dispute Settlement  
State regulation and governance of significant petroleum activities
narrowly defined already constitute a huge challenge but so will the
task of building and reforming a range of state institutions and agencies
that are less directly involved in petroleum activities and yet crucial to
their daily governance. Given their current capacity and susceptibility
to corruption such secondary institutions in Lebanon are unlikely to
cope. Particularly vulnerable to corruption is the Lebanese Customs
Authority, which although having gone through some institutional 
reforms since the 1990s is still struck by high levels of corruption and
inefficiency (IMF 2005). Western IOC officials expressed concern that
the import of highly specialized equipment and machinery unknown
to Lebanese customs officials (or absent from their inventory lists)
would likely cause costly delays in clearances, thereby creating 
opportunities or, from an importer’s perspective, a need for bribery to
expedite entry.48 Hypothetically, politicians with control over customs
officials, whether by way of their appointments or otherwise, could
use their leverage to press operators in making subcontracting decisions
in their favor, as often happens in Iraq.49
Numerous other state agencies and institutions with currently weak
anti-corruption controls will inevitably see their activities and workload
augmented when or if routine petroleum-related operations commence.
In this context, the risk of ‘bureaucratic overstretch’ is real (Ross
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2012, 209). Licenses and permits of all kinds are a domain wherein
Lebanese state agencies frequently are extremely cumbersome to deal
with unless bribes are offered to obtain them or to expedite formalities.
Similarly, enforcement of environmental regulations is often highly
selective when involving private interests of politicians and influential
businessmen with sufficient ‘protection’ (mahsubiya), as illustrated by
largely unsuccessful attempts to put a halt to illegal quarrying 
(Leenders 2004, 42-52). Several ministries and state agencies are 
currently involved in Lebanon’s preparations for its emerging petroleum
sector and are cooperating with the LPA to put in place appropriate
measures and reforms. In this context it should be noted that 
administrative reforms involving such and other public sector institutions
since the early 1990s have been slow and that tangible results have
been disappointingly limited (El Ghaziri 2007). Arguably, this has been
largely due to the crippling effects of Lebanon’s political settlement
and the failure of reformers to take this into account (Leenders 2004,
235-238). Whether Lebanon’s political class will grasp the need for
comprehensive administrative reforms in the context of petroleum
governance requirements as a way to reinvigorate and bolster 
administrative reform remains to be seen.  
Lebanon’s judiciary calls for specific attention in this context. 
Operators will to a large extent be able to resort to international 
arbitration clauses in its dealings with the state50 and with major
(sub-)contracts with providers and service companies. In this context
it should be noted that Lebanon has a reasonably good reputation in
terms of executing international arbitrators’ decisions, although at
times following long delays (Al-Akhbar 2007).51 Yet, such international
arbitration will to some extent still be dependent on Lebanon’s court
system for its execution. Smaller contracts involving Lebanese sub-
contracting companies will likely rely on local arbitration whereby in
addition to courts’ involvement in execution, and in the case of a 
disagreement about the appointment of an arbitrator, a court of first
instance will typically assign one (IBA 2012).52 Furthermore, criminal
infringements, including violations of environmental laws and 
corruption, fall under the sole jurisdiction of Lebanese courts. It is in
this context that the judiciary’s deficiencies in terms of integrity and
independence—as suggested by numerous international indices and
opinion surveys (see appendix 3)—will gain pertinence. If Lebanon is
to become a significant producer of oil and gas, its courts’ current 
corruption and inefficiency levels may become amplified by increased
workloads, by at times large and complex financial claims, and because
of the blurred public and private interests potentially troubling
Lebanon’s petroleum industry.
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Establishing a National Oil Company
Law 132 (article 6-1) stipulates that ‘when necessary and after promising
commercial opportunities have been verified, the Council of Ministers
may establish a national oil company on the basis of a proposal by the
minister based upon the opinion of the petroleum administration.’ 
Accordingly, a future option was created for an NOC to operate on the
production side of the petroleum sector. Yet, the legally enshrined 
requirement of such an NOC’s commercial viability and the explicit need
for the LPA’s endorsement appears to be as much designed to prevent
its immediate establishment.53 Regardless, the idea already prompted
some controversy as some Lebanese observers suspect that the running
of a Lebanese NOC will be riddled with corruption and struck by 
inefficiencies, akin to the experience with Electricité du Liban
(Takieddine 2013; ILPI 2013, 18; Sarkis 2014).54 They also point out
that NOCs worldwide, and especially in the Middle East, have often been
prone to corruption (Barms 349-350). Lebanese common skepticism
vis-à-vis an assertive role of the state, and ‘statism’ more generally, is
echoed by international financial institutions and some IOCs who have
their own reasons and arguments to counter the worldwide trend toward
establishing NOCs and ‘resource nationalism’ (Ross 2012 39-41, 59-62,
240-241). Yet, analogies with seemingly similar and corruption-ridden
institutions, within Lebanon or in other petroleum producing countries,
can be as helpful as they are deceptive. With the creation of any new
state institution vested interests and long-established expectations of
entitlement will be less engrained. This does not remove the risks of
corruption but it does offer new opportunities to break with ‘business
as usual’. In the longer term, an NOC is likely to promote Lebanon’s
high-end human capital to be employed in the sector while it will allow
for higher returns on petroleum production. While aiming for these
goals, a Lebanese NOC could cooperate, partner with, and learn from
IOCs that have both the capital and expertise to spearhead offshore
petroleum activities. From a perspective of corruption control, the NOC’s
initial and inevitable dependency on the IOCs, possibly by way of 
taking part in a consortium, would generate some important checks
and balances on the Lebanese NOC as its partners are unlikely to 
tolerate systemic and loss-making mediocrity, corruption, and cronyism.
In addition, as argued below, an NOC may play an important role on
the revenue side of the value chain and help to enhance public 
accountability vis-à-vis the petroleum sector at large.
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Revenue Management Options, Expenditure and
Risks of Corruption
Of course, the more one moves up Lebanon’s prospective value chain
involving petroleum, the more speculative the analysis will be. This
certainly applies to revenue management, spending aims and targets,
and procurement and expenditure mechanisms. The complex choices
that will have to be made in this respect will and should not only be
steered by concerns or efforts to reduce corruption risks, but the latter
certainly deserves to receive close consideration. Understandably, since
Lebanon’s petroleum potential still needs to be confirmed, few concrete
steps have been taken in this direction. Accordingly, a public debate
on the issue is in order in preparation for the day that petroleum 
revenues may arrive.
The ‘Sovereign Fund’ and Its Management
Law 132 (article 3) mentions that net proceeds arising out of petroleum
activities or rights will be placed in a ‘sovereign fund’, leaving it to
another law to prescribe its specific management. However, it does 
already specify that the fund as such will be designed for saving 
purposes, meaning it will keep the capital and part of the proceeds
‘for future generations’, and only make available the dividends from
investments for other, current purposes. From a perspective of inter-
national best practice, the very mentioning of the fund is congruent
with the widely accepted notion that petroleum is a depletable resource
that has developed over millions of years and that, as such, there is
no moral justification to spend it all by the generation that happens
to stumble upon it. However, other motivating factors come into play
as well, including policies to counter ‘Dutch disease’ effects and 
stabilizing sharply fluctuating revenues associated with high price
volatility in petroleum prices, intentions to use the dividends for 
developmental purposes and economic diversification, and attempts to
separate the petroleum proceeds from the ordinary state budget to
better control their usage (‘ring fencing’) (World Bank 2014, 19-29).
For the topic of the current paper, the idea that such funds can be
helpful in insulating revenue management from day-to-day politics
and the risk of waste and corruption is most relevant. Accordingly,
since the early 1990s many oil producers have established such special
funds. All these considerations have also informed the Lebanese 
intention to establish a petroleum fund, including a resolution to
counter corruption, waste, and the plunder of what may be significant
volumes of precious resources.55
The problem is that worldwide experience suggests that ‘sovereign
wealth funds’ often have done little to advance the goals for which they
were established. In fact, they can even worsen the risk of corruption.
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As a recent report by Revenue Watch Institute put it: ‘The rhetorical
appeal of natural resource funds as symbols of development and
progress has sometimes outstripped their practical value as solutions
to specific macroeconomic or budgetary problems. This lack of clarity
represents a real danger, as poorly conceived funds can become 
channels for corruption’ (Revenue Watch Institute 2014; Bulte and 
Damania 2008, 246-254).
In this context, of course, it is of essential importance that there
exist strict rules for withdrawals, clear and legally bolstered criteria 
or earmarks for expenditure, and high levels of transparency and 
accountability. Even so, more often than not, as one scholar on 
petroleum governance found, ‘politicians sweep aside institutional
constraints to gain control over how a valuable resource is allocated and
regulated—giving them the power to use it for patronage or corruption’
(Ross 2012, 209). ‘Fund raiding’, as happened under Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi’s
rule in Libya, is the most striking example of this as billions of dollars
were consumed, spent on white elephant projects and other dubious
investments, or simply vanished in numerous private bank accounts of
the Qadhafi family and their allies (Global Witness 2012). Another
example of this is the expenditure of petroleum proceeds held in such
funds on arms in times of extreme political crisis, as happened in Chad
where its fund for future generations, even when supervised by the World
Bank, was cancelled in 2005 following several coup attempts against
President Idriss Déby (Pegg 2009, 311-320). Yet, even when such excesses
cannot be ruled out in non-dictatorships or even (semi-) democracies,
it is striking that blatant and massive ‘fund raiding’ appears to be a
trademark of heavily centralized and coercive authoritarian regimes. 
Given Lebanon’s unruly, fragmented, or pluralist political system
(or, as one author called it less euphemistically, its ‘authoritarianism
by diffusion’) (El Khazen 2003, 53-57), the probability of fund raiding
appears to be less acute except, perhaps, in times of full-scale war
(Al-Ayyash 1997, 170-173).56 A much greater risk, however, is that by
design, or by reflecting the lowest common denominator of the
Lebanese political class’ demands and preferences, the institutional
checks and balances on Lebanon’s sovereign fund will be too diluted
and too weak to withstand escalating political pressures to make
withdrawals, for instance to achieve or restore a ‘confessional balance’,
or indeed to create opportunities for grand corruption (Eifer et al.
2003, 116).
In the context of Lebanon’s crippling political settlement it is 
extremely doubtful that, from scratch, a new agency can miraculously
emerge that will sustain the solid institutional qualities to withstand
political interference and offer guarantees of full transparency and 
accountability, even when such features remain a necessary precondition
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for effective corruption controls. However, in this context some
Lebanese and foreign observers have already suggested that the
Lebanese Central Bank could be a suitable candidate to manage the
fund, which would certainly not be unusual as central banks elsewhere
are often the designated manager of sovereign wealth funds given
their asset management expertise. Indeed, the Lebanese Central Bank
has by and large preserved its integrity and independence, in sharp
contrast with most public institutions (Leenders 2004, 225-230). In
this context, the Norwegian International Law and Policy Institute 
observed in a report on Lebanon’s emerging petroleum sector that
‘[t]he combination of strong qualitative performance combined with a
shared understanding among Lebanese of the importance of [the central
bank’s] independence ... was part of the explanations informants gave’
(International Policy Institute). The report continues that for its 
integrity and independence the central bank should be viewed as ‘a
model’ for petroleum governance. Yet, the main reason why the central
bank did not succumb to political pressure and muhasasa is far from
selfless respect for institutional independence; arguably, it was the 
direct result of the fact that the central bank’s independence was and
still is the pillar of the lucrative market for treasury paper. Lebanon’s
private banks rely heavily on this market and political elites are
among its key owners (Leenders 2004, 230). One lesson that can be
drawn from this, crudely as it may sound, is that Lebanon’s political
class needs to sustain a private interest in preserving or respecting
the sovereign fund’s independence and integrity. This hardly offers
grounds to see the central bank as a ‘model’, as the circumstances under
which its institutional qualities arose are somewhat anomalous and,
indeed, not immune to controversy. Perhaps one way to go about this
is by placing the fund within the central bank, and closely integrating
the general management of the central bank with that of the fund
(e.g. by granting its governor overlapping roles and responsibilities).
This way one will intently connect the country’s market for treasury
paper and associated interests of private banks, with the management
of petroleum revenues, and thereby help create vested interests
among the political class in good governance. In short, the way in
which the sovereign fund will be managed and by whom, and how this
will relate to the interests of the political elites, will be essential for
any rules on withdrawals and technical safeguards for independence,
transparency, and accountability to stand a chance of being respected.
Sovereign Fund Allocations and Expenditures
Having an effective fund manager in place, whether this is the central
bank or otherwise, will not guarantee that all resources that it releases
according to set rules on allocation and earmarking will be effectively
26
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spent without waste, cronyism, and corruption. For one, such will be
dependent on the implementing agencies including line-ministries, 
especially if at least part of the revenues will be allocated, for instance,
to infrastructural projects, initiatives enhancing social welfare provision,
and poverty alleviation. Partly due to Lebanon’s dismal record of 
institutional weakness, political interference, muhasasa, and corruption
in public procurement and public welfare provision, some have already
suggested radical alternatives to circumvent this problem. Paying off
Lebanon’s hefty public debt and/or re-financing (parts of) it, is one such
a proposal (Le Commerce du Levant 2012).57 From a purely economic
and financial point of view there are certainly grounds to argue for this.
Moreover, it is argued that this would radically resolve any problem or
remove any risk of the country’s expected petroleum wealth being
squandered. At first sight, and from an anti-corruption perspective, the
suggestion sounds appealing. Yet, for a number of reasons it ultimately
fails to be persuasive. First, it is highly doubtful that there will be 
political or indeed popular support for the idea, as spending (most of
or all) the proceeds from petroleum will be viewed as financing past
corruption and waste while it would have the opportunity costs of 
ignoring urgent problems such as widespread poverty and sharp regional
socio-economic imbalances. Second, without guarantees of fiscal 
prudence, paying off the public debt may simply improve the state’s
creditworthiness, which could be an incentive to start the borrowing
and spending cycle all over again in a context of still failing or lacking
political and administrative reforms. In this sense, paying off the debt
now could be tantamount to financing the corruption of tomorrow.
Third, by hypothetically removing any opportunities for corruption on
the revenue-side via drastic debt repayments, the scramble for access
to and muhasasa in the production-side of the petroleum sector is
likely to be intensified, negatively affecting production performance.
Fourth, paying off the entire debt, if indeed the size of petroleum 
revenues would allow for this, would eradicate the treasury paper 
market and put the private banks out of business. By implication, this
would remove one of the very few remaining pillars of cohesion and
collaboration among the political class. 
The allocation of significant petroleum proceeds and their expenditure,
or that of sovereign fund dividends, is bound to entail a menu of items
that will all deserve to be considered and financed, including paying
off part of the public debt and refinancing other parts to bring it back
to more healthy proportions, as well as expenditures on public 
procurement, social welfare, and poverty alleviation. Judging from
Lebanon’s past experience with reconstruction, public procurement in
particlular will run the risk of rampant corruption. However, as the
case of Mongolia illustrates, the arrival of revenues from mineral assets
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could be seized as an opportunity for drastic reforms in this context. In
2013, Mongolia established a new central procurement agency, which
takes major spending responsibilities for large projects away from line 
ministries, standardizes procedures and makes them fully transparent
online (Van den Brink 2012, 6). Most strikingly and promisingly, it 
allows a role for civil society organizations in both bid evaluation and
contract monitoring.   
The need for decentralization and empowering Lebanon’s local 
governorates and municipalities—long advocated but with relatively
small results—may also gain extra relevance and urgency in the 
context of the revenues made available by petroleum production and
strategies to spend them wisely. Smaller, local constituencies are more
likely to demand higher standards of governance and public service
delivery. For now, at a central level, local interests and agendas often
translate into pressure on MPs who respond by offering their patronage
in order to be re-elected. 
Cash Handouts
Perhaps the most radical proposal aimed at circumventing Lebanon’s
dismal public sector performance and widespread corruption is to use
(parts of) petroleum revenues for cash transfers to all adult Lebanese
citizens. Such an arrangement is carried out, in various ways, in the
oil-rich US state of Alaska, in Bolivia, East Timor, and Mongolia (Gillies
2010; Ross 2012, 237-238). In Lebanon, late Finance Minister Mohamad
Chatah, who was assassinated in December 2013, was perhaps the most
vocal proponent of cash handouts (Chatah 2012). The arguments in
favor of cash handouts are multifold and include expected gains from
circumventing corruption-ridden state institutions, countering citizens’
dependency on politicians’ patronage, and encouraging a relationship
between the state, its petroleum revenues, and citizens (Devarajan
2010). From this perspective, all Lebanese will gain a direct stake in the
performance of petroleum governance, and they are thereby assumed
to press for greater accountability and corruption controls. Yet, at
least in theory, the counter-arguments appear equally persuasive.
First, it is far from certain that citizens will spend the handouts wisely,
for example by saving them or by investing in education. Anecdotal
evidence about how Lebanon’s sizeable remittances are spent and 
consumed in this respect is not encouraging (Daily Star, 2009).58
Second, if no serious measures are taken to address the monopolistic
and oligopolistic features of its economy, the opportunities of both 
increased consumption and investment will be merely captured by a
rent-seeking business class. Third, cash handouts, if done properly,
would be neutral in terms of income distribution. In some countries
that may not be a problem, but given Lebanon’s large disparities in
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income and wealth this may be viewed as an opportunity cost that is
difficult to defend (Shaxson 2007, 1123-1140).59 Fourth, there are no
guarantees that cash handouts will promote popular pressures for 
accountability and good petroleum governance; it may merely cause
the public to demand higher production (Gillies 2010). Finally, and 
assuming that the cash handouts will be sizeable enough to undermine
politicians’ patronage, there are no a priori reasons to believe that public
decision-makers would cooperate and this way bankroll themselves out
of office (Leenders 2004, 64-71).60 Overall, and despite some of its
drawbacks, the idea of cash handouts certainly deserves consideration.
In this context, introducing conditional cash transfers could also be
considered; for example by issuing vouchers for health and education
services, either indiscriminately to all citizens or targeted at vulnerable
groups (De la Brière 2006). Direct transfers, whether being monetized
or in kind, will not be a panacea for solving the corruption problem
once and for all. Yet, should cash transfers become part of the menu
of spending items associated with a hypothetical windfall of petroleum
revenues, they would perhaps be best placed within the central bank’s
sovereign fund where they could be kept and managed separately in a
‘Mohamad Chatah Account for all Lebanese Citizens’.
Capitalizing a National Oil Company and Enhancing Public Accountability
While there may be compelling reasons for the eventual establishment
of a Lebanese NOC in terms of high-end employment generation and
revenue maximization, it may also make good sense for investment
policies and encouraging public accountability vis-à-vis the petroleum
sector at large. There are, of course, many alternative ways to capitalize
an NOC, and all need to be carefully considered from an economic, 
financial, and commercial point of view. One option may be for the
Lebanese state to direct part of its petroleum revenues, or the dividends
of its sovereign fund, to capitalize an NOC that, in a lasting partnership
with IOCs, will face scrutiny to operate effectively and efficiently. Next
to direct majority state ownership, all Lebanese adult citizens could
be made shareholders in the NOC, this way perhaps complementing or
substituting for possible direct cash transfers, as discussed above. For
reasons of political expediency, another part of the NOC’s shares could
be designated for open subscription. Accordingly, it may be reasonably
expected that Lebanese citizens and the country’s political class will
gain not only a direct stake in the good governance of petroleum 
revenues but also in its production, thereby encouraging accountability
and responsible expectations of sustainable petroleum production. It
may be in this context that an NOC’s necessary institutional insulation
from Lebanon’s crippling political settlement, and more conventional
designs to ensure efficiency and transparency, may have a better
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chance to take hold and last. To be sure, any such scheme involving
public distribution of shares will face challenges and obstacles that
will need to be carefully addressed (Palley 2003, 6). Yet, such efforts
may be worthwhile given the accountability effects that are likely to
result from the citizenry’s acquired stakes in the production of 
petroleum that, first and foremost, is theirs.
Summary and Recommendations
When it comes to analyzing the risks of corruption in Lebanon’s
emerging petroleum sector, and indeed corruption more generally, the
devil is in the details. Moreover, a sector-specific focus on the risks of
corruption needs to be firmly placed and understood in Lebanon’s 
political, social, and economic context before one can make sensible
and feasible suggestions or recommendations for ways to mitigate them.
The risks of corruption in Lebanon’s emerging petroleum sector should
not be discounted. To begin with, and given the country’s consistently
disappointing performance in the past in terms of sound institution-
building and countering corruption, it does not have a good head start
for good petroleum governance. By tracing the sector’s prospective path
down the value chain, from oil extraction, revenue generation, and
management, up to expenditure policy options—this paper identified
various vulnerable locations or areas of concern, and it gave reasons
to be wary about the risks of corruption. In doing so, the paper is
hardly comprehensive or exhaustive, but has pointed to the daunting
institutional and political challenges awaiting Lebanon when or if it
becomes a significant petroleum producer. In the end, however, much
will come down to the volume of petroleum revenues that will reach
the shores of Lebanon. This, of course, depends on what petroleum 
reserves IOCs will eventually find. What will also matter a great deal
in this context is the Lebanese government’s discipline in what is now
sensibly designed as a gradual and phased approach to assigning 
offshore blocks and opening them for production.61 This would not
only make sense in terms of countering the risk of ‘Dutch disease’ and
bureaucratic overstretch, but also of mitigating the risk of widespread
corruption bankrolled by large rent windfalls.      
It should also be noted that Lebanon’s recent legislation and 
establishment of new relevant institutions, such as the LPA, strongly
suggest awareness of the complex issues at stake and a resolution
adopted by many to address them. Yet, what has thus far been put 
in place or foreseen in terms of maximizing transparency and 
accountability is far from perfect, let alone corruption-proof. Key in
this context—and given Lebanon’s awkward political settlement—is
to sort out the right politics to uphold these good intentions, and 
improve and strengthen the institutions and policies relevant to the
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sector that have already been put in place.
When it comes to recommendations, there is no desire to join the
chorus of ‘administrative reform’ and ‘good governance’, which in
Lebanon and elsewhere have generated a generic set of platitudes
stripping institutional reform from its political underpinnings and its
consequences (Bukovansky 2006, 181-209). Neither does it make
sense for a foreign analyst to impose their recommendations for better
petroleum governance onto Lebanese policymakers and the public at
large; all policy options should primarily arise from a national debate
that by itself would already feed a culture of greater accountability.
Nevertheless, perhaps a number of suggestions can be useful for this
debate to center on possible remedies. 
Across the value chain of petroleum production it will be essential
that Lebanon’s fractured civil society use the opportunity and 
momentum of building petroleum governance structures to find common
ground in demanding transparency and accountability, and in jointly
scrutinizing every aspect of how the sector will be managed. In this
context it should be noted that there are already various modest but
promising initiatives by civil society organizations which aim to raise
public awareness and knowledge relevant to the petroleum sector and
its governance, and monitor Lebanon’s media coverage of the issue
and enhance media capacity.62 Lebanon seems to be on the verge of
becoming a petroleum producing country. There is now momentum and
an opportunity to coalesce these initiatives and expand their reach.
Strikingly, and despite their differences otherwise, most Lebanese of
varying sectarian and/or political backgrounds appear to be largely in
agreement that strong efforts should be made to prevent the emerging
petroleum sector from sinking into the all too familiar scenario of
rampant corruption and cronyism.63 Such efforts may perhaps be most
effectively channeled into a joint and concrete initiative. 
Against this background it may be worthwhile to establish a
Lebanon petroleum watchdog comprising a broad coalition of
Lebanese civil society organizations and activists who follow and 
document developments in the petroleum sector with the aim of 
scrutinizing petroleum-related policies and activities, increasing 
public awareness, and demanding full transparency and accountability.
In conjunction with this, overall petroleum governance would 
benefit from a pro-active role of IOCs in publicizing and explaining
their intentions and efforts, especially in the context of anti-corruption
controls, to the Lebanese public as soon as they commence their 
operations. If or when Lebanon adopts the EITI and enters into business
with IOCs, other petroleum companies will take part of a multi-
stakeholder group that could provide a platform for public outreach.
Given Lebanon’s past of widespread corruption and opaque business
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practices, IOCs will need to do more. For instance, IOCs should 
establish a strong relationship with the Lebanon Petroleum Watchdog,
and be highly responsive to queries on the integrity of the petroleum
sector generally that will undoubtedly arise in Lebanese society as
soon as production starts. 
With regard to the overall governance structure put in place to 
regulate and manage Lebanon’s petroleum sector, the following 
suggestions can be made: 
Grant the Lebanese Petroleum Authority (LPA) greater institutional
and full budgetary independence from the Ministry of Energy and
Water (MEW).
Make the selection and appointment of all LPA staff the sole 
prerogative of a special committee (‘the Petroleum Human Resources
and Oversight Committee’), consisting of the president of the civil
service board, the deputy-governor of the central bank, and the 
minister of state for administrative reform, and supported by a review
panel of internationally renowned and qualified experts and academics
in the field of petroleum governance.
Clearly assign, define, and separate the MEW’s prime task of formulating
overall petroleum policies, subject to approval of the Council of 
Ministers, and the LPA’s role as regulator and overall policy enforcer in
the petroleum sector.
Subject the MEW’s prerogative to present LPA staff to the disciplinary
board to binding review by ‘the Petroleum Human Resources and 
Oversight Committee’.
Strengthen the Court of Account’s capacities to audit the LPA, and 
ensure that all its reports and/or findings are made publicly available. 
To ensure full disclosure in this respect, all work carried out by the
Court of Accounts will need to be saved on a protected server 
accessible to ‘the Petroleum Human Resources and Oversight 
Committee,’ which can decide to disclose these or parts of these data
when it deems necessary.
Abrogate current legal stipulations that compel the LPA Board of 
Directors to obtain ministerial approval before making public 
statements.
On top of these cross-sector suggestions, a number of recommen-
dations pertain more specifically to locations on the petroleum value
chain, following the order of contexts in which they emerged in this
paper.
With regard to the pre-qualification process and tendering toward
EPAs:
Request all prequalified operating companies and non-operating 
companies, and all their participating partner companies—or all such
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companies that are successful in obtaining EPAs—to fully and publicly
disclose their ownership and major shareholders. 
Failing this:
Present full public disclosure of ownership as a biddable item for the
EPA bidding round.
Fully and publicly disclose the final EPA contracts or at least release
information on the ownership of all winning companies, partner 
companies, and their subsidiaries, and disclose the agreements
reached on all biddable items, including cost oil stipulations.
Demand that all (operating and non-operating) companies, their 
partners, and subsidiaries, and all subcontracting companies, be 
registered in jurisdictions that are fully transparent.
Place severe penalties on all companies involved in petroleum 
production and upstream activities that hide, conceal, or defraud 
provided information identifying their ownership.
With regard to plans to establish a Lebanese National Oil Company,
after necessary and promising commercial opportunities have been
verified, and in order to ensure that it will operate effectively and 
efficiently:
Legally compel the Lebanese National Oil Company, even at the later
stages of its development, to only engage in oil production activities
in consortiums in which IOCs are a key operating partner.    
With regard to upstream subcontracting:
Adopt a robust anti-trust law and put in place a fully competent and
independent regulator, and establish a unit therein specialized in 
petroleum-related activities.
Demand full public disclosure of all large subcontracts and the tendering
process that preceded them.
Failing this:
Oblige all consortiums to turn such a disclosure into a biddable item
for their tendering and subcontracting process.
Establish an automated register that makes procurement processes
fully and continuously transparent to all parties involved and to the
public at large.
With regard to revenue management and efforts to enhance 
transparency and accountability:
Commission the central bank to establish a unit fully integrated into
its overall top management to manage the sovereign fund. 
Within the sovereign fund, allocate petroleum proceeds, or fund 
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dividends, but no more than one-third of total petroleum revenues, to
pay off parts of Lebanon’s public debt and refinance other parts.
Establish a new Central Procurement Agency, which takes major
spending responsibilities for large projects away from line ministries,
standardizes procedures, makes them fully transparent, and allows for
participation of civil society organizations in both bid evaluation and
contract monitoring.
Reinvigorate reforms aimed at decentralization and empowering local
governance to prepare the latter for receiving earmarked expenditure
from petroleum income.
Consider and weigh the arguments in favor of and against limited
and/or conditional direct cash transfers via the sovereign fund’s 
‘Mohamad Chatah Account for All Lebanese Citizens’.
If or when the Lebanese National Oil Company will be established, 
ßensure that a majority of its shares will be held respectively by the
state, in addition to a part of its shares being distributed to all
Lebanese citizens, and the remainder reserved for open subscription.
34
n
n
n
n
35Spoils of oil? Assessing and mitigating the risks of corruption in Lebanon’s emerging offshore petroleum sector
Appendix 1
Corruption Risks in Stages of Petroleum Production
Table 1 Corruption risks prior to operation
Activities
Preliminary 
assessment of
potential
Development of
regulatory
framework
Establishment or
granting of role
to NOCs
Granting of
rights
Prior to the development
of an oil industry and
petroleum law.
The set of legal instru-
ments and institutions
needed to prepare for
and monitor operations,
including production.
National oil companies,
often established or
given important roles.
Pipelines, ports, public
services, ownership of
equipment, technology,
data, etc.
Corruption risks
Usually low. Though diplomatic 
pressure may already be placed on host
governments by oil companies.
Important to secure adequate legislation
and allocate regulatory functions to
competent institutions, and thus avoid
political interference in individual
cases.
Secret transactions and exemptions from
ordinary rules in society. Home country
support in international tenders may
have advance consequences in the
market. Threat to undermine regulatory
authority on the pretext of commercial
interests. Often used as means of
avoiding political accountability when
favoring certain oil companies.
Bribery may influence decisions in
favor of certain parties.
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Source Farouk Al-Kasim, Tina Soreide and Aled Williams, Grand Corruption in the Regulation of
Oil, (Christian Michelsen Institute: 2008).
Table 2 Corruption risks in operational phases
Pre-qualification
Tender, selection
and award
Exploration
Identification of
reserves
Field Development
Plan (FDP)
Production
End phase
Phases and Activities
Mechanisms of approval
decided.
Auction to award 
concessions. Negotiations
and contracting. Decisions
about local content.
Awarding of concessions
for exploration only 
or exploration and 
production combined.
The search for oil 
deposits.
Precise geological 
identification of oil 
reserves. Oil production
cannot begin until 
resources are proven.
Decisions about pro-
duction profile and cost
recovery schemes.
Extraction of oil 
deposits.
Winding up of 
production.
Corruption risks
High risk of corruption.
Pre-qualification can, conversely, be
very important to ensure efficient 
operation and high recovery rates.
Could be used more actively to secure
professional business conduct.
Procurement related risk is usually high.
Procedures are not sufficient to prevent
corruption since serious risk is connected
to criteria for awards, rules of exemption,
or violation of the procedures.
Low risk of corruption. Risk of 
leniency in accepting insufficiency in
meeting work commitment.
Low risk of corruption connected to
these geological analyses, although there
may be a risk of fraud in the presentation
of the results. These data form the
basis for negotiations on the FDP.
High risk of corruption, either related
to the original contents (cost recovery
and production profile) or to amendments
of the original contents.
Low risk of corruption. There is 
generally limited regulatory interference
at this stage, though greater controls on
production could be beneficial in some
contexts. Risk of leniency in accepting
FDP changes without expert scrutiny.
Low, though there may be some risks
associated with decisions about 
precisely when to stop production and
the quality of decommissioning.
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Appendix 2
Indices, Surveys and Polls on Corruption in Lebanon (1992-2014)64
Source
Transparency 
International 
Corruption 
Perceptions Index
(CPI 2003-13)65
Heritage Foundation
Index of Economic
Freedoms 
(1996-2014)66
Transparency 
International
Global Corruption 
Barometer 
(2009-2013)67
Nature of assessment
Annual poll of polls
on perceived 
corruption levels 
(0 most corrupt, 10
least corrupt).
Measuring freedom
of corruption in %
points.
Corruption relevant
questions to 
respondents in
public poll.
Sources
Surveys and expert
assessments by 
international 
rating agencies.
2003-2014: CPI
1996-2002: ‘Expert’
assessments incl.
US state agencies.
Gallup public 
opinion poll.
Main results
2013: 2.8
2012: 3.0
2011: 2.5 
2010: 2.5
2009: 2.5
2008: 3.0
2007: 3.0 
2006: 3.6
2005: 3.1
2004: 2.7
2003: 3.0
In comparison in
2013, On par with
Mali, Gambia, and
Russia, Lebanon’s
score worse than
11 countries in
MENA region. 
2003-8: CPI
1996-2014: 10%
1996-2014: Lebanon
among region’s worst
six performers.
2013: 61% think that
corruption increased
a lot. 69% deems
judiciary to be 
corrupt/extremely
corrupt, followed
by political parties,
public servants, and
parliament. 65%
think government
anti-corruption
measures are inef-
fective. 2009: 14%
admits to having
paid a bribe in the
past 12 months.
64
Taken from: Leenders, Spoils of Truce, 
pp. 3-5—yet updated for 2008-2014 
(separately referenced where applicable). 
65
http://www.transparency.org/research/cp
i/overview 
66
http://www.heritage.org/index/
67
http://www.transparency.org/research/
gcb/overview  
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Global Integrity
Index (2006-9)68
Lebanese 
Transparency 
Association/REACH
poll of private sector
views on corruption
in Lebanon (2013)69
Economic Research
Forum Institutional
Country Risk Guide
(1992-1998)
World Bank World-
wide Governance
Indicators (1998,
2003, 2007, 2012)70
Measuring existence
and effectiveness
of anti-corruption
controls and rule of
law (0 weakest,
100 strongest).
Corruption relevant
questions to 
respondents in poll
of private sector.
Measuring perceived
corruption levels (0
lowest corruption,
10 worst).
Measuring per-
ceived control of
corruption (0
worst, 100 best).
Own in-country 
experts and peer
reviewed.
Poll among 800
Lebanese 
entrepreneurs.
Weighing and 
ranking average of
‘expert’ assessments
by international
rating agencies.
Expert assessments
and Gallup poll
among Lebanese
public.
2009: 55 (‘very weak’)
2007: 54 (‘very weak’)
2006: 48 (‘very weak’)
In comparison In
2009 Lebanon
scored worse than
Jordan and Syria.
73% of respondents
think corruption is a
very serious problem.
61% admit to paying
bribes to facilitate
and expedite public
sector procedures
and formalities, and
25% admit to 
resorting to blackmail
to obtain access to
public services.
1998: 10
1995: 4
1992: 8
In comparison:
Lebanon’s 1998
score on par with
Colombia and worse
than Indonesia and
all countries in 
region. Corruption
levels rising faster
than anywhere else
in the world.
2012: 21.0
2007: 31.4
2003: 40.8
1998: 51.0
In comparison:
Lebanon’s scores
sharply declining,
and worse than most
countries in the
MENA except Syria. 
Source Nature of assessment Sources Main results
68
https://www.globalintegrity.org/global_
year/2009/
69
Cited in The Daily Star, 28 June 2013.
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Business/Le
banon/2013/Jun-28/221825-survey-
shows-lebanese-corruption-at-all-time-
high.ashx#axzz2vYfbHdRC
70
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/
index.aspx 
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Information 
International
Benchmark Poll on
Corruption in
Lebanon (1999)
Information 
International Poll
elections (IIM 
September 2005) 
Lebanese Center for
Policy Studies poll
on elections (2005)
Information 
International Poll
(IIM November
2003)
Information 
International Poll
(IIM December 2002)
Simon Haddad poll
(1998)
Corruption relevant
questions to re-
spondents in public
poll.
Corruption relevant
questions to 
respondents in
public poll 
following 2005
elections.
Corruption relevant
questions to 
respondents in
public poll during
2005 elections.
Corruption relevant
questions to 
respondents in
public poll.
Corruption relevant
questions to 
respondents in
public poll.
Corruption relevant
questions to 
respondents in
public poll on 
‘political trust’.
Representative
sample of Lebanese
adult population.
Representative
sample of Lebanese
adult population.
Representative
sample of Lebanese
adult population.
Sample of Lebanese
adult population in
Greater Beirut area.
Representative
sample of Lebanese
adult population.
Representative
sample of Lebanese
adult population.
86% deem corruption
levels to be very
high, 27.2% deem
all politicians 
corrupt, 61% deem
corruption in all
public utilities to be
high, 59% think most
public employees
accept gifts, nearly
100% think bribes
are common.
75.8% deem curbing
waste and corruption
to be top priority
of new government
yet 48.2% think it
will not succeed in
prosecuting those
guilty of corruption.
22% prioritize
fighting corruption
as main task for new
government while
28% prioritize other
economic policies.
53.8% blame
mounting public
debt on corruption
and waste.
38.1% blame 
economic crisis on
waste and 
corruption.
68% think that
‘quite a few’ people
in government are
‘crooked’, 70%
think government
is run by officials
looking out for
personal interests.
Source Nature of assessment Sources Main results
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Statistics Interna-
tional poll 
(An-Nahar, 25 
October 1996)
World Bank
Lebanon Investment
Climate Assessment
(2006)
Sami Atallah/
Lebanese Center for
Policy Studies poll
(1998)
World Bank
Lebanon Private
Sector survey
(1995)
Economic and Social
Council for West
Asia FDI Lebanon
poll (Mansour 2001)
Corruption relevant
questions to 
respondents in
public poll.
Corruption relevant
questions to 
respondents in poll
private sector.
Corruption relevant
questions to 
respondents in poll
of Lebanese private
sector.
Corruption relevant
questions to re-
spondents in poll
of Lebanese private
sector.
Corruption relevant
questions to 
respondents in poll
of foreign investors
in Lebanon.
Representative
sample of Lebanese
adult population.
Sample of Lebanese
businessmen and
private enterprises.
Sample of Lebanese
businessmen and
private enterprises.
Sample of Lebanese
businessmen and
private enterprises.
Sample of foreign
businessmen in
Lebanon.
62% say they 
personally witnessed
incidences of 
corruption in public
sector dealings, 60%
hold ministers respon-
sible for corruption,
17% expect 
improvements, 77%
think that corruption
has worsened.
Businessmen 
complain about
high costs of doing 
business blamed on
inter alia corruption,
public procurement
viewed as most 
corruption prone.
60% say Lebanese
government suffers
from lack of 
credibility, 62%
admit to paying
bribes, corruption
and ‘informal com-
petition’ strongest
perceived obstacles
to doing business.
In comparison:
Lebanon scores
considerably worse
compared with
businessmen’s views
in MENA at large.
High cost business
environment blamed
on inter alia cor-
ruption and stifling
state bureaucracy.
Corruption 
identified as main
discouraging factor
in doing or 
expanding business.
Source Nature of assessment Sources Main results
Source Leenders, Spoils of Truce, pp. 3-5 --yet updated for 2008-2014 (separately referenced
where applicable).
The Freedom House Index (2014) includes the subcategory of ‘rule of
law’ assessing the quality and integrity of the judiciary. Lebanon
scored five out of sixteen (maximum).71 In regional comparison,
Lebanon achieved the same score as Algeria and out of eighteen 
countries in MENA (except the Palestinian territories that were not
surveyed), Lebanon was outperformed by five countries (Israel, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, and Tunisia) gaining higher scores.
Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer (2013)
asked respondents to identify whether certain sectors of government
were ‘corrupt/extremely corrupt’.72 In Lebanon 69 percent of 
respondents assessed the judiciary accordingly. By comparison, in the
ten countries of the region surveyed, the Lebanese negative assessment
of the country’s judiciary was only worse in Algeria (72%) and Morocco
(70%). In all other (seven) countries (Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Yemen, Libya,
and Palestine) surveyed in the MENA region fewer people viewed their
own judiciaries as ‘corrupt/extremely corrupt’.
The World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business index (2013) measures
countries’ performance on, inter alia, ‘enforcing contracts’, which 
includes an assessment of judicial efficiency.73 Among 20 MENA 
countries (except Israel) surveyed, Lebanon was outperformed by
eleven countries. More specifically, on the variable ‘trial and judgment’
the index suggests that on average court procedures take 556 days to
complete while ‘enforcement of judgments’ takes one hundred fifty
days. In comparison, among twenty MENA countries surveyed (which
excludes Israel), Lebanon’s score on ‘trial and judgment’ was worse
only in Egypt (720), Djibouti (750), and Syria (590). Lebanon’s score
on ‘enforcement of judgment’ was outperformed by eight countries 
in the region, which put Lebanon in a slightly more positive light
compared to its score on ‘trial and judgment’. However, the latter
hardly warrants giving Lebanon the predicate of ‘beacon’ for the MENA
region as a whole. More generally, the World Bank’s disappointing
score for Lebanon on judicial efficiency sharply contradicts the 
anecdotal evidence given by Mr. Abirached (AR 7.2/3/4/5) and his
claim of an efficiently performing Lebanese judiciary facing no 
fundamental problems in terms of severe delays or case backlog.
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Appendix 3
Lebanon’s Judiciary in International Indices and Opinion Surveys
(2009-2014)
72 
http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/
countries  
73 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings 
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The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report
(2013-14) assesses countries’ ‘judicial independence’.74 Lebanon scored
2.3, placing it at country rank of 135 out of 148 surveyed countries.
On ‘efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes’ Lebanon scored
2.7, placing it at country rank of 130 out of 148 surveyed countries.
In comparison with the eighteen countries surveyed in the MENA
(which excludes Syria, Iraq, and Palestine), Lebanon’s scores on 
‘judicial independence’ and its score on ‘efficiency of legal framework
in settling disputes’ were worse only in Yemen (which received a score
of resp. 2.2 and 2.2.). All other surveyed countries in the region
scored better.
The World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index (2014) measures
countries ‘rule of law’.75 Lebanon’s overall score on the rule of law was
0.51, placing it fourth out of seven surveyed MENA countries (Lebanon,
UAE, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and Iran) (one: best, seven:
worst). More specifically, Lebanon’s civil justice system was ranked
sixth out of seven surveyed MENA countries while its criminal justice
system fourth out of seven. Of respondents to the survey, less Lebanese
(0.46) viewed ‘no corruption in the judiciary’ than the region’s average.
For the civil justice system, less respondents than the region’s average
viewed ‘no discrimination’ (0.48), no corruption (0.45), ‘no improper
government influence’ (0.39), and ‘no unreasonable delay’ (0.31). 
The Economic Freedom of the World Index measures, among other
factors, countries’ ‘judicial independence’ and ‘impartial courts’.76 On a
scale of zero (worst) to ten (best), Lebanon’s inadequate scores on its
‘judicial independence’ were 2.31 (2011) and 2.48 (2010) and its
scores on ‘impartial courts’ were 3.17 (2011) and 2.94 (2010). In other
words, Lebanon’s judicial independence worsened while the impartiality
of its courts improved. It does not become immediately clear from the
index why this would be the case, although it may be suggested in
this respect that the term ‘judiciary’ includes state prosecutors (and
‘courts’ do not) whose credibility indeed has been increasingly 
undermined by political interference in the context of the prolonged
detention without any evidence of four suspects in the Hariri murder
case. In comparison, Lebanon’s scores on its judiciary’s independence
and impartiality are extremely low even by the Middle Eastern region’s
poor standards. In fact, Lebanon’s scores are closer to that of Russia,
which in 2011 received the slightly higher score of 2.59 on judicial 
independence, although Russia’s score on impartial courts was, at
2.87, worse than Lebanon’s.
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74 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Glo
balCompetitivenessReport_2013-14.pdf
75 
http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/
#/index/LBN 
76 
http://www.freetheworld.com/2013/EFW2
013-complete.pdf 
In 2009 the Lebanese judiciary scored 61 (‘very weak’) for its 
‘accountability’ in the international index on government accountability
and transparency prepared by Global Integrity.77 It gave a score of
zero (extremely ineffective) for the effectiveness of Lebanon’s 
‘regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the
national-level judiciary’. 
An opinion survey jointly held by the Lebanese Transparency 
Association and polling agency REACH in 2013 found that amidst
Lebanese common perceptions of high and growing levels of corruption
in their country generally the judiciary came in second as being
viewed as suffering from most corruption after the Lebanese customs
authorities.78
The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS) and Statistics 
International conducted a survey in December 2010 and again in
April 2011 among nearly 1,400 Lebanese for the Arab Barometer 
project. It found that only 24.7 percent of respondents viewed the
Lebanese judiciary as trustworthy; a little more than ‘government’ and
‘political parties’, but behind the country’s security forces, civil society,
and the armed forces.79
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77 
https://www.globalintegrity.org/global/th
e-global-integrity-report-2009/lebanon/
78 
Cited in The Daily Star, 28 June 2013.
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Business/Le
banon/2013/Jun-28/221825-survey-
shows-lebanese-corruption-at-all-time-
high.ashx
79 
http://www.arabbarometer.org/sites/
default/files/countyreportlebanon2.pdf 
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